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THE STRANGER WHO RESIDES WITH 
YOU: IRONIES OF ASIAN-AMERICAN 
AND AMERICAN INDIAN LEGAL 
HISTORYt 
JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER* 
When a stranger resides with you in your land, you shall not 
wrong him. The stranger who resides with you shall be to you as 
one of your citizens; you shall love him as yourself, for you were 
strangers in the land of Egypt: I am the Lord your God. 
- Vayikra (Leviticus) 19:33-34 
I want to begin by noting the personal poignancy of the timing of 
this conference on the Korematsu decision. Tomorrow I will be building 
a sukkah with my family and friends to prepare for the Jewish holiday 
of Sukkot. We build a shack that has an imperfect roof, open to the 
elements, so that we can both see the stars and feel the rain, to connect 
with the heavens and the earth. We do this to commemorate the time 
of exile after the Jews had been miraculously freed from slavery but 
had not yet reached the promised land-the time of wandering in the 
desert. This was a time of homelessness and a time of mutual support, 
a time of fear and a time of manna from heaven-a time, in other 
words, of terrible contradiction. 
In celebrating Sukkot, we remember that we were slaves in the land 
of Egypt so that it will never happen again, to us or to anyone else. We 
remember that we were freed so that God would give us the Torah, so 
that we could accept the covenant with God in which we agreed to 
abide by divine commandments and accept certain obligations. Among 
those obligations are our obligations to the dispossessed-the widow, 
the stranger and the orphan-those who have no property, or whose 
family ties have been shattered. We remember that the stranger "shall 
be as one of your citizens" and "you shall love him as yourself." We 
are reminded that property is not permanent, that injustice can rule, 
that people can be treated as slaves. We remember that property is both 
something we own and something owned by the non-owner. We have 
t ©1998 by Joseph William Singer. 
* Professor of Law, Harvard Unh·ersity. Thanks and affection go to Martha t-.1inow, Keith 
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obligations to the widow, the stranger, the orphan; they have a claim on 
social resources-a property right, if you will. We remember being 
strangers ourselves. We remember that it is our obligation to remem-
ber. And this memory has consequences for us-consequences of 
earth-shattering importance. "You shall not oppress a stranger, for you 
know the feelings of the stranger, having yourselves been strangers in 
the land of Egypt. "1 
In light of this injunction, when I read Professor Keith Aoki's study 
of the Alien Land Laws and Professor Sumi Cho's study of Earl War-
ren's role in both enforcing those laws and supporting the internment 
of Japanese Americans, I was struck by a series of terrible ironies. 
THE IRONY OF INVASION 
The first irony is the incredible fear of foreign invasion voiced by 
people who had just completed their own invasion of foreign lands. 
Asian immigrants were seen as foreign invaders-different, inas-
similable, dangerous. The imagery of an invasion by a fearful racial 
"other" was widespread and motivated both the Chinese Exclusion Act 
of 1882 and the Immigration Act of 1924 which ended Japanese immi-
gration. The timing of each of these acts is ironic. The Chinese Exclu-
sion Act of 1882-passed to stem the horde of invaders from the "Far 
East"-followed two much larger invasions, also from the east. In 1846, 
the United States invaded Mexico and seized roughly two-thirds of its 
territory.~ And between 1850 and 1880, we saw the wholescale invasion 
of American Indian lands west of the Mississippi River by the United 
States in response to the discovery of gold in California.3 The discovery 
of gold in California reversed the former policy of separating the 
"savage Indians" from the civilized white man. The seizure of two-thirds 
of Mexico, the discovery of gold and the settlement of California ended 
any hope of separation. Manifest Destiny ruled the day. 
The fear of invasion by Asian immigrants followed right after the 
United States' own invasion and seizure of Indian lands. The timing 
of the Chinese Exclusion Act makes one wonder whether white leaders 
of the United States possessed a guilty conscience about their own 
invasion of foreign lands. Through legislation about the Chinese, they 
could indeed have been speaking about themselves and their own 
actions. The timing of the 1924 Immigration Act, closing Japanese 
1 Shelllot (Exodus) 23:9. 
~ See ALAN BRINKLEY, THE UNFINISHED NATION 333-37 (1st ed. 1993). 
3 See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER 609-758 (1993). 
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immigration, coincided with the 1924 Citizenship Act, by which all 
American Indians were made citizens of the United States, whether 
they wanted to be or not. Absorbed into the United States, colonized, 
and subordinated-the 1924 Citizenship Act was one more step along 
the path of conquest and invasion of Indian lands. 
The great irony of the Alien Land Laws story is that they simulta-
neously denied both property and citizenship to people who wanted 
these things while forcing American Indians to accept both property 
and citizenship against their will. "\Then we juxtapose the legal treat-
ment of japanese immigrants and American Indians, we see that the 
means of oppression are various. People can be oppressed by denying 
them citizenship and by granting them citizenship. They can be op-
pressed by denying them property and by granting them property. 
THE IRONY OF ASSIMILATION 
The Chinese Exclusion Act, the 1924 Immigration Act and the 
Alien Land Laws were premised on the notion that Asian immigrants 
could not be assimilated. It is ironic, as Professor Aoki points out, that 
United States law prohibited japanese immigrants from becoming 
United States citizens, and that the United States then used the fact 
that such immigrants retained a connection with the japanese emperor 
as proof that they were dangerous and could not be assimilated. This 
belief in the savage, inassimilable "other" replayed the arguments for 
removal of Indians from east of the Mississippi to Indian Territory (in 
what later became Oklahoma) in the 1830s. The Cherokees, Choctaws 
and Creeks in the South, and the Shawnees, Potawatomies and Miamis 
in the Northwest Territory, were removed from white society because 
they were viewed as savages. The patent falsity of this proposition did 
not matter. The Cherokees, for example, developed an agricultural 
lifestyle, a written language and a constitution. They were so "civilized" 
that some Cherokees even owned slaves. The same arguments used to 
justify removal of Indians were used to justify the Alien Land Laws, 
immigration restrictions and, ultimately, internment. Again, their truth 
or falsity did not matter. They were believed to be true by the whites, 
and that was enough. 
Similarly, japanese immigrants were denied the right to own prop-
erty on the ground that they could not be assimilated. They were 
denied the right to become United States citizens on the same ground. 
Yet at the same time the Alien Land Laws were being passed and 
enforced between 1913 and the 1940s, the United States had instituted 
a policy of forced assimilation of American Indians. The Dawes Act of 
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1887 provided for the wholesale dismantling of tribal lands; title was 
taken from the tribes and transferred to individual tribal members. 
Rather than communal ownership managed by the tribe, individual 
ownership of particular parcels was required. 
The allotment policy was part of a larger assimilation policy. Grant-
ing individual rights to tribal members was intended to break tribal 
allegiances and eventually result in the dismantling of tribal govern-
ment. It was intended to make Indians into settled agriculturalists and 
ranchers, to accept the idea that the pursuit of self-interest is the 
highest good. Communal obligations were to be eradicated; private 
property would instill values of individualism, independence, self-reli-
ance and liberty. At the same time, Congress created the Courts of In-
dian Offenses, which, among other things, punished Indians for prac-
ticing tribal religion and custom. Congress funded religious schools to 
Christianize the Indians. Boarding schools were created and children 
taken from their parents to turn them into "Americans." Their hair 
was cut, they were dressed in "chilized" clothing and they were pun-
ished for speaking their native languages or engaging in customary 
religious practices. 
This process of forced assimilation culminated in the 1924 Citi-
zenship Act by which all American Indians were made citizens of the 
United States. While the granting of citizenship might be viewed as a 
good thing, it is important to remember that it was part of a policy 
designed to eventually destroy tribal citizenship. It was not a policy of 
dual allegiance but a policy of shifting allegiance to the United States 
from the tribes. Although the act might be viewed as a long overdue 
recognition of citizenship, it can also be viewed as a policy of forced 
citizenship that undermined the strength of tribal governments and 
traditions. 
The irony is apparent. At the same time the states were passing 
Alien Land Laws designed to prevent Japanese immigrants from be-
coming property owners, the federal government was forcibly granting 
individual property rights to Indians who, for the most part, did not 
want those rights. They did not want these property laws because they 
came at a terrible price-the price of forced assimilation and conquest. 
THE IRONY OF PROPERTY 
The third irony of the Alien Land Laws is the willingness of the 
Supreme Court that decided Lochner v. New York 4 to sacrifice its emerg-
4198 u.S. 45 (1905). 
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ing view of the sanctity of freedom of contract and private property in 
order to protect white supremacy. The theory of Lochner was that the 
state could not interfere with the "right of contract" and that any such 
interference constituted a deprivation of "liberty" in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Yet in Terrace v. Thompson~ and Porterfield v. 
Webb,l; the Court ruled that the Alien Land Laws did not "iolate the 
Constitution, even though they clearly interfered with the liberty to 
buy and sell property-a central component of the freedom of contract 
ideology. Likewise, in Plessy v. Ferguson,i the Court upheld the Jim Crow 
laws of the 1890s, even though they similarly interfered with the free-
dom to contract between persons of different races. 
The American Indian situation not only reflected the Plessy phi-
losophy but was supported by the "iew that foreign relations and 
citizenship were areas beyond the rule oflaw. Immigration and citizen-
ship policies were treated as subjects within the competence of the 
legislative and executive branches. Denial of property to non-citizens 
was perfectly appropriate since the polity had the power to determine 
membership. Accordingly, in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,8 decided two years 
before Lochner, the Supreme Court ruled that Indian affairs were 
political questions within the sole discretion of Congress and the Presi-
dent. Thus, abrogation of treaty-based property rights did not amount 
to a deprivation of property without due process of law (as one might 
have assumed under the reasoning of Lochner), but was a proper 
exercise of Congress's "plenary power" over Indian nations, a power 
apparently without any constitutional limits whatsoever. The protection 
of freedom of contract as a constitutional right sits uneasily with the 
proposition that Congress could take tribal property without any con-
stitutionallimit. 
THE IRONY OF WARREN 
We also have the irony of Earl Warren. Professor Sumi Cho points 
out the contrast between Warren's reputation as a liberal growing out 
of Brown v. Board of Education (I and its progeny, and his role in enforc-
ing the Alien Lands Laws and promoting internment of Japanese 
Americans before his joining the Court. To this comparison, I add 
another. 
5263 U.S. 197 (1923). 
fi 263 U.S. 225 (1923). 
7163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
R 187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
9347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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In 1955, just one year after the celebrated Brown decision, the 
Supreme Court decided another, much less well-known case, Tee-Hit-
Ton Indians v. United States.1O In that case, the Supreme Court unani-
mously held that tribal property that had not been recognized by treaty 
or statute was not "property" within the meaning of the Fifth Amend-
ment and therefore, could be taken by the United States without 
compensation. Thus, the United States could take timber belonging to 
the Tee-Hit-Tons without incurring any constitutional obligation to pay 
just compensation, as would be required for any other property owner 
in America. The arguments proffered by the Court are both remark-
ably un persuasive and decidedly racial. II 
Although Chief Justice Warren did not write the Tee-Hit-Ton deci-
sion, he did join it. The opinion was unanimous and he found nothing 
to quarrel with in the Court's reasoning. Following one year after the 
famous Brown decision, one wonders at the limits of the meaning of 
equal protection under the law. Tribal affairs remained, to a significant 
extent, an area in which the rule of law did not apply. The Brown era 
was also the termination era, in which the United States was busy 
ending the government-to-government relationship it had established 
with many tribes. Many tribes were "terminated" in the sense that 
federal recognition of tribal sovereignty was revoked. Each act of ter-
mination violated a pre-existing treaty and each act was predicated on 
the policy of forced assimilation. But the failure to define pre-existing 
Indian property rights-so-called "original Indian title"-as property 
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause does not 
sit well when compared with the rulings of the Marshall Court which 
held that Indian title is "as sacred as the fee simple of the whites. "12 
Warren may stand as a liberal icon, but his upholding of the Alien 
Land Laws, his refusal to invalidate internment and his approval of 
uncompensated seizures of Indian lands contrast strongly with this 
image. 
THE IRONY OF THE STRANGER 
We are a nation of immigrants. The only residents of the United 
States who do not fit in this statement are the descendants of those 
who were here when the rest of us arrived. And yet our nation of 
10 348 U.S. 272 (19:>:». 
II See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Well Settled?: The Increasing Weight of History in American 
Indian Land Claillls, 28 GA. L. REv. 481 (1994). 
I~Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711,746 (183:». 
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immigrants has told immigrants who become needy while they are here 
among us that they have no entitlement to basic subsistence. If they 
do not like this, they can work, even if they are elderly or disabled, or 
they can go back where they came from. 13 Those of us who were 
welcomed to this country by the words of the Jewish poet Emma 
Lazarus on the Statue of Liberty wonder at the hypocrisy and callous 
disregard shown to our newest residents. 
Give me your tired, your poor, 
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, 
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore, 
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me: 
I lift my lamp beside the golden door.14 
My father and my grandparents passed by those words as they 
escaped pogroms in Russia and Poland. The safe haven here pro-
tected them from the Nazi scourge that killed their relatives who 
remained behind. Do we not mean those words anymore? Should 
we wipe them from the face of the statue? Do we want only the 
vigorous, the wealthy, the young? 
The Alien Land Laws, the internment of Japanese Americans and 
the various programs to subdue and absorb American Indian nations 
strike us now as terrible errors. Yet in their time, they were supported 
by people who believed they were doing the right thing. V\11at are we 
doing now that we will regret in a hundred years? 
13 In the summer of 1997, President Clinton pressured Congress to restore disability payments 
to immigrants who were legally here on or before August 22, 1996, and who are or ,\"110 become 
disabled in the future. See Eric Pianin, Republicans Agree to Restore Some Welfare Benefits, WASH. 
PosT,July 26, 1997, at AIO, available in 1997 WL 11975836. Those disabled immigrants had lost 
benefits as a result of the welfare reform laws passed in 1996. Legal immigrants are still ineligible 
for food stamps. See Welfare ReJm7n Act Upheld in Federal Court; Ruling Allollls Aid Cuts to Infirm 
Legal Aliens, WASH. POST, July 25, 1997, at A12, available in 1997 WL 11975726. 
14JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 664 (15th ed. 1980) (quoting Emma Lazarus). 

